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First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
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Honorable Steve Yerby, District Judge, presiding 
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James G. 
[Idaho State Bar No. 1372] 
David P. Claiborne 
[Idaho State Bar No. 6579] 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-Mail: jgr@ringertlaw.com;dpc@ringertlaw.com 
Laura E. Burri #3573 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
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P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
Email: lburri@ringertlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




ROBERT STILLMAN, and 
GLORIA STILLMAN, husband, 
and wife, and all other residents 
designated as John Does I-X, 
Defendant. 
) 











NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF. THE 
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE 
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: ROBERT & GLORIA STILLMAN and all other residents designated as John Does I-X, 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that in order to defend this lawsuit, an 
appropriate written response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after 
service of this Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the Court may enter judgment against 
you as demanded by the plaintiff in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice or 
SUMMONS - Page 1 
Case CV-2007-885 
vs. 
Honorable Steve Yerby, 
[Idaho State Bar No. I 
David P. 
455 South Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
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with provides as 
B 
or anv 
expenses we incur. 
e. All costs taxed ~A'~>U'C" the in the 
R Vol. 3, Clerk's Motion Ex. at p. filed No\'. 
12, policy as "a civil proceeding in which damages because of 
'bodily 
are alleged. 
was correct in 
IS no 
policy to a 
held that any specific 
costs on a finding " R. Vol. 3, p. 





Ul'-JU,",CHH'.S that the 
District 
that ties its promise to pay 
not accurate. The 












fees to coverage is the language 
that 
reliance because the 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants' Brief; at 28. the 
are immaterial to the issues case and go to 
language of policies side by did in their 
differences. at 28. 
The crucial is the language 
inthe~~~~ 
Coverages" the 1!.!!~:!'.!£~ of the sections in 
language the Enumclaw Policy, under a heading entitled 
placement) of the heading 
in suits where the 
in the policies cited 
insurance. Placing the 
highlights the important 
of 
Coverages." was 
important to that court's determination that there was coverage for costs in that case. ld. at 10 12 
(the language that the company pay "all costs taxed against the in any suit 
defended by Company" as as a heading named 
that the are separate an In 
to o\\n 
Court 
the in their contract. ... ". at 
language in the it is clear that the costs 
IS of coverage for the underlying claim rise to the costs. 
s 
when a defense and the it should 
of costs. 1 5 
Idaho at 1012. While is flawed and could have a chill effect on the 
insurance the defense of mixed cases, it also completely ignores the 
reality its own counsel who 
RCI was on and 
to areas where felt the interests ReI were not adequately 
and of trial 
Because and the policies on the 
the duty to pay costs is a standalone 
coverage if is underlying coverage, -'.!.!.~~~.2=!.!~~~:.:......'-...!..~-,-,,-.;w supra, IS 
the 111 case and the District Court not have it in 
reaching its decision in case. 
3 
'.1' 
the this case, and 
not only does not apply, but was superceded a grant of 
Rules of See i...!.!.~~~~="-'.!.!."-,;l--'-'-
S 
check was determined to be "not because there was a 
subsequent petition the case not cited to upon by 
Court. However, even if it were ~.!.."'-'-'--"'~ case is not case 
because court was not the issue whether costs arising from non-covered claims 
in a case were Rather, that case a between two carriers, 
the was for the 
costs 
IS law, and is 
LD case. 
Donnelly's attempts to distinguish Mintarsih, the is that the 
Mintarsih case provides on persuasive which supports a finding there is not 
coverage the costs taxed against RCI in this case. 
4 
to Mintarsih, the to pay costs is 
at onset the 
case, then it 
to 
a the 
contract to a case on all there may 
be duty to pay costs. defends all claims in a case, even some 
of the 
the 
are clearly not because it is to defend at least one of 
of the ""'-!.~=..,~ case a basic there is a contractual 
to defend there is a to pay costs and 
However, the court goes on to discuss the case is coverage some claims, 
and no coverage others. The Mintarsih court concludes that in such "mixed cases," the 
to defend does not give rise to a duty to pay costs and fees under a 
provision. Id. at 286. 
coverages 
In reaching this 
to defend, and an 
Mintarsih court between a contractual duty 
duty to defend. to IS 
a claim where facts are alleged that may give rise to coverage. ===,l75 
at 284, n. 6. In a "mixed action," the duty to defend clearly non-covered claims when 
are both non-covered claims 
implied-in-law duty to defend. 
potentially covered claims in the same case arises 
at 286. ~~~:..!.!.! court explained that there is a 
to 
an 
contractual obligation to defend potentially covered claims, and an implied-in-law obligation to 
5 




non-covered claims in a to fees under a 
supplementary 
is because the duty to defend claims in a "mixed" 
action that are not potentially covered is not a contractual duty, and reference 
in the to we 
those claims that the agreed to defend under 
ld. at 286 (emphasis added). 
The is a as L''-UHvU the 
there were claims and there were clearly non-covered The 
claims were covered, and those claims led to the entire 
the a 
In an appears to argue the ==== case 
was a because it tort claims wage out 
conclude case is not a "mixed because claims arise out of the 
same operative is not what the term "mixed action" means. A "mixed action" is one 
a is provided for claims, despite the fact that there are potentially covered 
and non-covered claims in the same This action is clearly a "mixed action" because 
6 
a defense was all claims, even non-covered because there was an _""_,-,_.'" 
a as 
to this case 
(the and the contract "does not give rise to an under a 
to pay costs awarded the that can attributed 
that were not covered." ===-,-,-"at 
the to IS 
that if there was a this case at the onset, then there was coverage 
the costs fees under Payments 
Brief, at 33-34. the case if were onlv covered claims this 
case. However, IS a action," and at the onset of this case, there was one 
covered claims were not 2 In where a 
covered claim, the insurer is not liable for payment 
costs on that were not covered from the outset of 
should be noted that defended this case under a of and then 
action to determine its rights responsibilities regarding 
coverage while the underlying action. See v. Rimar Constr. Inc. and David and 
Kathy Donnelly, Bonner County Case CV 2007-00885. procedure is the proper way to 
protect the interests the insured still receive a determination of contractual rights in a case 
as this. is puzzled by comments questioning why would 
defend the action, Note 6 of Respondents/Cross-Appellants' Brief clearly 
defend its insured until such time as it had a the Declaratory Judgment action. 
7 




on what later to the 
\vent even 
after the may have been awarded 
based solely on As noted IS 
to pay costs HJCHULnv to the non-covered 
on even in the 
to IS IS 
to defend. The better public policy is to to a 
defense in "mixed to to a defense after claims giving to coverage 
are extinguished. 
had tried to get the issue coverage resolved to filing a declaratory 
judgment action. However, the Donnellys moved to stay the declaratory judgment action until 
after the trial of the underlying matter. the Donnellys themselves prevented 
coverage issues prior to trial, leaving the 
through trial, or risk an decision in 




have been awarded on s claim in the for 
breach Donnelly concedes that contract-based LaHL'~'''' are not subject 
to coverage and the must be able to 
as a tort-based claim. of may have 
been to the in the 
arguing that a negligence claim was asserted. 
, Brief at 4-5. A close review the proceedings in the 
Verified Complaint filed in the 
breach of contract, misrepresentation/fraud/nondisclosure, 
includes for 
breach violation of the Act, and quiet title/declaratory 
relief. R .3, Clerk's (Plaintiff's for Summary Ex. 
12,2009). As to breach of contract claim, it a vague reference that 
damage may have from negligent conduct RCI, the claimed as a result thereof is 
clearly alleged to in contract because alleged that "[a]s a direct and proximate result 
of have suffered 
damages." ld., at pg. 10-11. See also Cross-Appellants/Respondents' at 4-5. 
9 
, the relative to the breach contract 
on claim. VoL 
Clerk's If • i.;.. ~ 
and awarded as to the tort claims on 
and It is 
noteworthy that the general "-'~"r'- to alleged negligence RCI and 
Rimar based upon the allegation as an engmeer or The 
found that RCI and Rimar acted as an architect or 
The 
and nature 
based on the of contract is a red The that deserve 
analysis a determination insurance coverage are those upon which was and 
damages were awarded the claim and the consumer protection act claim. 
B. Donnelly not challenge the District Court's determination that there is no 
coveragefor statutory-based damages. 
On not the the that the 
damages of ",,,,.,vvv awarded by the jury in the Litigation is subject to 
coverage the Cross-Appellants/Respondents' Brief; at 3, As this 
4During the course of the Underlying Litigation Donnelly did claim bodily from 
potential carbon monoxide poisoning - a potential tort-based claim in negligence - but the 
District Court did not permit any evidence regard to be presented to the jury, R Vol. 3, 
Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's Motionfor Sumrnary Judgment, Ex, C, filed Nov. 12,2009). The 
exclusion of that evidence occurred less than one month before trial - after began providing 
a defense to RCI; after the declaratory judgment action had been filed; and after the declaratory 
judgment action had been stayed. 






argues that the mere to a 
reservation of rights, is that tort-based property damages were claimed by Donnelly 
and subject to coverage. Cross-Appellants/Respondents' Briej~ at 5-6. 
misinterprets contents reservation letter. 
insured that there be coverage any 
unequivocally to insured that 
EMC will be providing a defense 
IS a coverage 
that there is no coverage defective work or breach 
argument 
1l1\.11"'Ul'-U to its 
litigation because 
should be aware 
which are property damage. In addition, Exclusions a. and ill. are secondary bars 
to coverage. 
and 
R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's Motion for Ex. pg 2, filed Nov. 12, 
2009).5 EMC went on its letter to detail the alleged facts, potential bases coverage, and the 
reasons for non-coverage or exclusion. Id. clearly insured that no 
Donnelly's was subject to coverage, except claim for which as noted 
above was never presented to the jury. Id. As such, EMC's reservation of letter is not an 
admission that coverage may exist for certain property damage. It indicates completely to the 
sSaid reservation of rights letter also advised to obtain its own independent counsel 
for representation during the Underlying Litigation, and RCI in fact availed itself of this right. 
11 
the of its reservation of was not a basis the 
and as 
and the ill 
2. 
contends the is an unallocated 
general verdict. is simply jury returned a from which the 
District Court then the to 
judgment. both and 
damages. upon the and the 
is no coverage. 
An unallocated general verdict was not entered the in the 
Rather, the jury returned a special verdict, district court applied the law 
entry of a judgment. put, a "verdict" is "a jury's finding or decision on the factual issues 
of a case." BLACK'S LAW 
special nature, and the 
ityand 
A "general verdict" is one in 
at 1696 (9th ed. A 
is special in nature it is more 
m 
opposed to resolving specific fact questions." SLAW 
he or 
representati ve an 
one party or the as 
at 1696 ed.2009). 
is, where the jury enters a verdict finding generally for one party, without specifying the 
reasons therefore among varying claims, then the verdict is general in nature. 
States, 157 U.S. 277, 279 (1895). The Supreme confirms general IS 
12 
to be one 'by or any the 
the announces its returns 
the other a is one in "the makes on 
judge, who then decides the legal effect the verdict" 
LAW n"~'T'Tr"'T at 1697 ed. This meaning is confirmed by the 
has verdict is ... (w ]here the jury states the as 
find them to the of court thereon." ==-'-, 157 at 
verdict is 'in the a finding each issue of fact,'" and is 
permissible by Federal and State Rule ==;;;.' 339 F.3d at 1031. If the jury "returns 
factual leaving court to the ultimate it returns a speciaJ 
verdict.'· 
It is clear the rendered by in the IS a 
verdict. The does not contain any generalized findings of one party or the other 
by a general of UGlllla;~'- Rather, verdict the to a 
number posed to it facts were For 
instance, the answers "yes" to a question whether there was a contract between 
and ReI. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiffs Judgment, Ex. 1. 
filed 12, The jury answers "yes" to a question as to whether 
breached the contract ld., at Quest. 3. goes on to answer 39 
13 
to requiring to make From this, it is the role 
to Court 
the verdict" unallocated 
was that it made an that were a 
to the claims and on a basis for it 
allocated the proper award of damages. 
After a verdict by the in the Underlying Litigation, the District 
to the claims entered 
in a case." 
BLACK'S at 918 ed. the 
various claims involved in the Underlying 
claim relief asserted by the parties in the 
The judgment actually goes through each 
Litigation and makes a determination 
Donnelly prevailed on its breach of contract liability. For instance, the judgment recites 
claim against as as on 
Clerk's (Plaintiff's 
it recites that ReI 
of the 
Summary Judgment, Ex. at (ITl, 3, 
R Vol. 3, 
Nov. 12, 2009). 
on s claim breach of express 
<J[ 2. 
In the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation also allocated damages 
among the claims upon which relief was found tc; be appropriate. For instance, damages ""ere 
only awarded on three distinct and 
breach of the implied warranty of 
claims. 
14 
judgment awarded $126,611.55 
$1,000.00 each on two separate claims 
at 
violation consumer protection statutes. at (H 3,4, 5. Such finite discreet recitals, 
exactness 
each 
it is in the was 
granted, and the precise amount of damages awarded on each claim, it is not to the 
facts and law on those matters to the Applicable Policy to determine whether coverage 
applies. Based on such reasoning, the Court properly determined that there was no 
in the which Donnelly received This 
is u\..'~nl""'" those are excepted coverage as contract 
based damages. 
3. The jury finding of liability, and award of damages. on the breach of 
implied warranty of workmanship claim was a contract-based award 
subject to an exclusion from coyerar:e. 
District Court properly determined that all of the damages awarded for the breach 
the implied warranty workmanship claim in ,vere on contract 
. Whether the damages n"",\..:",\..u by the jury to work performed by Donnelly or 
consequential damage to other property not worked on by is irrelevant since the entirety 
of the damage was based on existence a contract. The contract liability exclusion in 
the Applicable Policy clearly applies to warranty of workmanship claim. at least under the 
circumstances presented by the Underlying Litigation. 
The proceedings of the Underlying Litigation unequivocally demonstrate that the District 
Court presented the warranty of workmanship claim to the jury as a contract-based claim. The 
15 
jury instructions provided in the Underlying made it clear that on the 




have the burden of ... [a] contract existed between and the 
Donnellys" - the fact that the of a contract is a necessary element of the 
claim demonstrates that it sounds contract;6 and 
In assessing ~C"U~I"~u breach warranty the 
was to have 
been in contemplation both as a result breach when the 
contract was made" - District Court's use, yet again, of the word "contract" 
indicates that the damages to be are in the nature of contract. 7 
The jury's award of damages was entirely dependent on the existence of a contract, so the 
contract liability exclusion is applicable. The District so 
6R VoL 3, Clerk's LUH"U~ 
filed Nov. 12,2009). 
(Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment, Ex. inst1'. 51, 
7R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. inst1'. 90, 




court costs JH'JCU,~ have been 
IDAHO § 41-1839. For the reasons set In s 
Sept. 21, 2011), at pp. 33-36, asserts the Court 
correctly a fee award was not proper. Donnelly made no proof loss upon 
asserted no money ualHa;"c.,,~ and no evidence 
any upon EMC for a sum before a 
and therefore had no under IDAHO 
Third, to Donnelly's argument, EMC never waived the that a loss 
first be provided. s 
B. Even if Idaho Code §4I-1839 is applicable, the District Court's rejllsal to award 
fees to Donnelly is harmless error. 
Even if is correct in of IDAHO § 41- it would not 
result in reversal the District Court's determination. District Court's 
would merely error because Donnelly was not a prevailing party and not to 
an award of fees any instance. The rule of law is clear that where a ruling of the court 
8Donnelly cites Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Assoc., 101 Idaho 772 (1980) for the 
proposition that waived the proof of loss requirement this action. Bonner County is 
inapplicable and distinguishable from the facts of this case because the waiver in Bonner Countv 
was based upon the insurers rejection of the tender of defense on a covered claim. ld. at 777. 
Here, provided a defense and therefore never waived the proof of loss requirement. 
17 




It is to award based upon 
must in the as a whole. As as 1965, this 
Court, in the propriety of an avvard of fees under IDAHO CODE § 41-1839, held that -
then that IS 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees. 
293, 1 (1 
the Idaho Court an award of 
Then, in 
fees under IDAHO CODE § 
41- is reserved an claim." Manduca Datsun, 
63, 68 App. 
added). Manduca court further stated that "[i]n order to receive an award under [IDAHO 
CODE § 41-1839], an insured must ~"--'-== the litigation." at 169 (emphasis added). 
m the and that a was not 
to § 41-1839 where it did not in the action. 
~=-=o 
Idaho 411,415 (2006). 
foregoing firmly that under law a is not 
of fees under IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 that party actually 
prevails the action. EMC submits that Donnelly did not prevail in the action as a whole, which 
IS a precedent to any costs or fees. submits 
18 
no to action the that therefore no party is 
to a\vard of 
In a three the 
Court as to ( 1) the whether there were 
or and (3) the extent to each issue or 
J. Joseph C.L.U. Ins. Assoc. v. Vaw?:ht, 117 555 
judicial declaration that there was insurance coverage for approximately $426,000 in damages it 
had sustained, as well as judicial voidance of a settlement agreement between RCI and 
The only result was a declaration coverage for approximately 
a 
In the amollnt failed in regard to its claim 
con veyance and to issue Insurance coverage the actual umHU!'-v,J 
it was awarded in the Underlying Litigation. Rather, prevailed on the issue of insurance 
coverage actual damages, and Donnelly voluntarily relinquished its claim for fraudulent 
conveyance. Under these circumstances, EMC submits that the results of this action have been a 
draw - no party has prevailed in the action as a whole to date. 
Where a party does not prevail entirely, it is not entitled to an award fees. 
Engineering Co. v. Daum Indus .. Inc., 102 363 (198J). specifically, where each 
party is partly successful in its claims against the other, there is no overall prevailing party and 
each side ought to bear its own costs and fees. See id. In =~'"" 
$13,698 and the Defendant was awarded ownership of a note. 
were awarded 
at 158. The note was a ten-
year note with a face value of $20,000. ld., at 156. Based upon these awards, the trial court 
determined the case was a draw and no party prevailed. at 158-59. decision was upheld 
19 
on The ratio In case was not too far the 70/30 ratio 
issue case. cases 
was not 
and lost on 
~=~, 120 1) and contractor each on one 
the two issues between but each received less than the 
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
In order that awarded costs and they must have 
in action as a Because no to is the 
overall As to any award 
fV. 
COULD 
DONNELL Y BECAUSE 
Donnelly has not challenged on appeal the s determination that 
was not to award fees or court costs in action 
§ 12-120(3). that of the District Court's 
V. IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR 
JUDGMENT PROVIDING 
MONEY DAMAGE AWARD. 
COURT TO A 
BUT PROVIDING NO 
Donnelly argues that the District Court erred in entry its judgment by providing 
only declaratory relief and not providing Donnelly was a specific judgment money 
damages in the amount $296,933.89. argument lacks merit. 
20 
Court decision on cross-motions for 
not s 
decision. R VoL 3, p. and 
3, p. 514-516. 
was those related to 
declaratory relief. other every claim that monetary damages was dismissed 
stipulation, parties instead leaving at issue those that sought the District Court's 
declaratory judgment. There being no monetary damages or relief before the District 
Court at the fiml was entered, there was no adequate basis a 
urges the Court to hold that damages are encompassed as 
and parcel a declaratory action, and in so arguing relies upon ""-!.:..==:...J.-:..:....;~=== 
"'-===..=..:0:=,62 Idaho 544 (1941). While Court in Sweenev interpreted a contract and then 
awarded damages based upon that interpretation, Sweeney does not stand for the proposition 
urged by Donnelly. The reason that the Court Sweeney the ofa 
contract and subsequent award of damages was because the complaint requested such 
relief. at 548, 551. Sweenev only establishes that a party may include in a 
judgment a request for entry of monetary relief. In this action, Donnelly made no request. 
instead only asking the District Court to interpret the Applicable Policy. 
The operative pleading of Donnelly before the District Court at the time of entry of the 
final judgment was the Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim filed on or 
about July 12,2010. R Vol. 3, p. 398-406. Second Amended Ans}ver included a 
21 
against a judgment on the coverage issues. Id. 
to pay 
in the 
or money U,.uLlU;~'- these 
there was no basis for the District Court to now or alter the judgment to grant 
Donnelly relief it seek way of its \.A}\HW,-,' 
"lILt".'U terms to 
s 
coverage Issues in the s Re: l1(/otioll Those 
negotiations resulted in preparation of a stipulation and order that all claims and issues 
the action not resol ved the Court's Re: Recc)llsideratiol1. Those 
negotiations resulted in preparation of a final appeal purposes. Counsel for 
Donnelly was course included in 3, s 
Opposition to to ""''''"U Judgment, Ex. A, 8,2011). Donnelly 
approved the form the order and was 
submitted to the District and filed. R 3, p. 504-509. The form of conforming order 
agreed to by counsel was submitted to the Court entered the 
Second Amended included a counterclaim fraudulent conveyance 
that arguably could provided a basis upon which to award money damages to Donnelly 
payable by EMC. However, Donnelly dismissed, prejudice, the fraudulent conveyance 
counterclaim before entry of the final judgment. R Vol. 3, p. 504-507. 
same. R 3,p.SlO-S13. the agreed to was 
7. 
to seek or 
or amendment the j \vas necessary under 
never alleged error or law in the 
Donnelly complained that the judgment did not include relief. The purpose Rule 
S9( e) is to provide a means to 
705,707 (l 
judgment, or in orders 
an appeal" by 
in proceedings." 
never 
which the final 
never pointed to any error of law reflected in the 
judgment is based. 
"a mechanism to correct 
error fact in the 
More 
or in the orders 
Given the foregoing, the District Court correctly entered a judgment providing 
for declaratory relief declining to enter an award money 
the 
no for an award attorney fees on appeal. Donnelly an 
award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to CODE § 41-1839. EMC asserts, the 
reasons argued above, Donnelly is not entitled an award of fees pursuant to said statute. 
23 
court's 
costs insured the 
this 23 rd day of November, 2011. 
24 
Telephone: (208) 345-7832 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564 
E-Mail: aellis@ebslaw.com 
Attorneys for Respondents 
25 
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or 

